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Introduction 
 
It is now around 20 years ago that regional
1 governments began seriously to try and influence 
EU decision-making. This paper is an attempt to map out a series of shifts in how an 
important group of ‘legislative’ regions has tried to secure that influence. They have done so 
in the context of a union comprised of member states which are represented in EU decision-
making in almost all key respects by their central governments. Regions remain, despite two 
decades of effort, marginalised by the structure of EU decision-making. The argument 
developed here is that while regional governments set out 20 years ago with a transformative 
project designed to challenge the centrality of the member state in the EU, legislative regions 
have in the last few years come to endorse, even buttress the centrality of the member state.  
 
The terminology of ‘legislative’ regions is relatively new and has become current since the 
establishment of the lobby group ‘Regions with Legislative Power’, or RegLeg, in 2000. An 
earlier, equivalent terminology was that of ‘strong’ regions (Jeffery 1994: 22). Legislative, or 
‘strong’ regions have elected parliaments which make laws with direct effect on the public 
goods and services provided to citizens in the region. Most of the bigger EU member states 
have legislative regions – Germany, Spain, Italy and the UK – as do Belgium and Austria 
(plus special status island regions in Finland and Portugal). Most of these make laws on 
health, education, environmental policy, local government and regional economic policy, and 
some do on internal security matters and taxation.  
 
The qualifier ‘legislative’ was introduced to mark out such regions as a special group with 
interests in European integration distinct from other kinds of regional and local authority 
across the EU. The essence of that distinctive interest is to preserve the meaning of regional 
law-making powers in the context of European integration. There have been three 
preservation strategies. The first, already downgraded by the mid-1990s and now largely 
abandoned, was focused on the formal recognition of the regional level – the ‘third’ level 
(Bullmann 1994), after member states and the union itself – as a participant in EU decision-
making. Regions would become full-fledged partners in EU-level decision-making, sharing 
responsibility for those competences allocated to them under domestic law in a European 
frame.  
                                                 
1   The terminology of ‘regions’ is in many places contested. It is, however, a standard terminology for 
comparative analysis, offering a shorthand route through the various and politically complex terminologies of 
that tier of government below central government and above local government, and it will be used here. 2 
 
The second strategy was that of co-determining the member state’s position in EU matters 
affecting regional competence through new structures of central-regional government 
coordination. It unfolded alongside the ‘third level’ strategy, though increasingly supplanted it 
during the 1990s. It too has revealed clear limits to its effectiveness as some regions have 
come to prioritise a narrow focus on distinctive regional interests which intergovernmental 
coordination has been unable to reflect. This narrowing of focus is discussed below as a 
process of ‘denationalization’, or regionalisation of conceptions of citizenship across EU 
member states. 
 
The first two strategies sought more effective means of regional participation in EU decision-
making. The third strategy for legislative regions has been defensive, that is focused on 
preventing the further Europeanisation of issues falling under their domestic legislative 
powers, even rolling back the reach of EU regulation. The concern is to retain autonomy, and 
increasingly legislative regions have viewed a strong member state structure as the best 
guarantee of that autonomy. The initial ‘third level’ strategy was in part about escaping the 
member state and finding new policy-shaping opportunities at the EU level; the more recent, 
defensive strategy, which was pursued with vigour especially in the European constitutional 
debate in the early 2000s, is about working through the member state to hold Europe in check.  
 
The adoption of this third, defensive strategy provides the analogy signalled in the title of this 
paper with Alan Milward’s (1992) classic work The European Rescue of the Nation-State. 
Milward’s book was an iconoclastic challenge to some of the imagery evoked by postwar 
European federalists of European integration as a somehow inevitable process that would 
supplant nation-states through the establishment of European federation. Milward’s view was 
that the founding fathers of European integration, including Schuman, Monnet, de Gasperi, 
Spaak and Adenauer, were first and foremost intent on rebuilding a European nation-
statehood which, by 1940, had conclusively failed to do what it aspired to do, namely provide 
freedom, security and prosperity for citizens. Against that background European integration 
was a conscious, instrumental decision by nation-state central governments to pool 
sovereignty in order to underpin nation-states with the robust foundations they evidently 
lacked.  
 
Milward’s work has been influential in the intergovernmentalist traditions of analysis of the 
EU. This paper is not meant in any direct sense as a contribution to the debates 
intergovernmentalists have had with others. The analogy with Milward is first and foremost 
about how governments at one level can (try to) instrumentalise the resources and 
opportunities available to governments at another. For Milward ‘nation-state’ (that is, member 
state
2) central governments fostered and instrumentalised an emergent transnational structure 
of government to achieve their own interests. This paper argues that regional governments 
have increasingly sought to instrumentalise member state central governments as a means of 
achieving their interests, that is preserving the meaning of regional law-making powers. It 
commences with a discussion of the conditions which prompt regional ‘mobilisation’ 
(Hooghe 1995) in the EU before examining in turn the three distinct strategies through which 
legislative regions have sought to realise their aims in the EU.  
 
 
                                                 
2   There are plenty of objections to the use of the term ‘nation-state’, not least because in many of the 
states which contain legislative regions the congruence of nationhood and statehood is imperfect, ambiguous and 
often contested.  3 
1. Why regional ‘mobilisation’? 
 
Back in the mid-to-late 1990s there was a slew of publications which documented the various 
forms of regional mobilisation within the EU, that is the growing engagement of regional 
government actors with the institutions and processes of EU policy-making (Jones and 
Keating 1995; Rhodes 1995; Hesse 1996; Hooghe 1996; Bomberg and Peterson 1998; Jeffery 
1997; Le Gales and Lequesne 1998). Though in some cases this mobilisation may have 
reflected an idealistic commitment to integration or attempts to circumvent a domestic 
conflict by instrumentalizing new opportunities for regional action at the EU level, mostly it 
had a simple source: as European competence expanded, in particular from the Single 
European Act onwards, it reached increasingly into fields of policy which within member 
states fell under the competence of regional governments. Generally regional governments 
were not able to set the terms under which their competences became EU competences. 
Central governments set those terms as privileged interlocutors of the member state with the 
EU. The mantra ‘member states are masters of the treaties’ establishing the EU meant, in 
effect, that central governments were, and still are, masters of the treaties. Those central 
governments then convened as the EU’s Council, its most powerful institution, to regulate 
policy fields which under domestic law had been regional responsibilities. In other words 
central governments, as a result of European integration, get to exercise regional decision-
making powers.  
 
Regional governments across the EU responded, logically enough, by seeking compensatory 
rights to act in EU decision-making within the framework of their domestic competence. 
Widening EU competence reached most into regional competence where regional competence 
was most extensive, that is in the strong, legislative regions. Logically enough those regions 
tended to respond by mobilising more intensively in EU politics than others with more modest 
domestic competences. As Marks et al (2002: 15) put it, ‘regions that are most entrenched in 
their respective national polities are most intent on influencing European decision-making’.  
 
The initial phase in this regional mobilisation unfolded in and around the negotiations in the 
Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) which concluded in December 1991 in Maastricht. It 
was broadly led by the German Länder which, alongside the Belgian regions, were the only 
regions with some grip over central government negotiating positions in the IGCs. Their aims 
were supported on a wider front through transnational lobbies in which German Länder were 
the driving forces: a conference of ‘strong’ regions convened by Bavaria, and the more 
broadly-based Assembly of the European Regions, in which Baden-Württemberg was the lead 
player (Jeffery 1994: 9, 22-3). This multi-pronged, and heavily German-accented approach 
put regional access to EU decision-making onto the European constitutional agenda at 
Maastricht and at all subsequent IGCs.  
 
At Maastricht it produced an ambiguous outcome. On the one hand the Committee of the 
Regions (CoR) was established as an advisory body on European legislation. For many in the 
Länder the CoR was the first step towards a legislative chamber of regions, just as the Council 
of Ministers was a legislative chamber of the member states, and appeared to bring the notion 
of a three-level union a closer (Hoppe and Schulz 1992). The other significant gain at 
Maastricht was for the Council of Ministers to be opened up to ministers from the regional 
level. That gain was carefully hedged. Regional ministers in the Council had to be in a 
position to commit their member state. This was not a general empowerment for regional 
ministers, but rather a possibility which had to be activated within the member state. And it 
could only be realised in practice in negotiation processes committing central and regional 4 
governments to represent a single and shared member state position. In all these respects it 
was a provision whose effect was to tie regions into the logic of member statehood, and 
therefore of a more conventional two-level union. 
 
To put it another way, what emerged from Maastricht were options for the German Länder 
and other legislative regions: a) that of working through the ‘third level’ route of the CoR, 
outside the framework of the member states; and b) that of negotiation and joint decision-
making on EU policy with central governments. Building on what they achieved during the 
ratification of the Single European Act, the Länder used Germany’s ratification process for 
the Maastricht Treaty to put a more systematic option b) in place. Constitutional changes 
adopted in 1992 established a new Article 23 of the Basic Law which set out how the German 
federal and Länder governments would cooperate in EU decision-making, when the Länder 
would have the decisive say, and when they would speak for Germany in the Council of 
Ministers. Subsequently procedures for central-regional government coordination on EU 
policy were established in Belgium, Austria, the UK and most recently Spain.  
 
 
2. Plan A: A Europe of the Regions 
 
Much of the earlier attention of observers of regional mobilisation was focused on the ‘third 
level’ route, made manifest with the inaugural meeting of the CoR in March 1994. Very 
quickly after that the German Länder and other legislative regions such as some of those in 
Spain (Jeffery 2003: 153) became disillusioned with the CoR. There are four reasons for this 
volte face (Jeffery 2002):  
 
1.  First the CoR had an unclear founding purpose, with the European Commission 
wanting on the ground expertise from within the member states to implement regional 
policy, and the German Länder and some others an institution with a genuinely 
representative function. This ‘compromise without consensus’ (Kalbfleisch-Kottsieper 
1995) prevented the CoR from hitting the ground running with a clear strategy.  
2.  Second the CoR was given only a limited advisory role, and no power to make its 
opinions count. So the Council of Ministers and European Parliament never listen to it 
and the Commission arguably only pretends to. 
3.  Third it has a very diverse membership of local and regional governments across the 
EU, in all their cultural and institutional diversity. This membership mix has not made 
for assertive decision-making, and the CoR has rarely produced crisp and forceful 
opinions. More importantly it leaves legislative regions as a minority group; RegLeg 
claims 74 members while the CoR has 317 members in total. That minority status is 
amplified by a basic divergence of interest between legislative regions and other 
‘weaker’ regional and local governments in EU decision-making. That divergence has 
to do with power. European integration, by absorbing regional level competences at 
the EU level has tended to disempower legislative regions, to reduce their scope to 
influence public policy on their territory. The founding conception of the CoR of the 
German Länder and others was as a mechanism which would help compensate for this 
disempowerment. That conception was not shared by the majority of the CoR 
membership. The domestic functions of non-legislative regional and local authorities 
are not typically law-making, but rather the coordination and implementation of 
central government policies in regional and local contexts, often within tightly defined 
frameworks allowing only limited decision-making autonomy. Engagement with EU 
decision-making, often nurtured by the European Commission in its search for 5 
expertise in policy implementation (Tömmel 1998), has opened up new policy-
shaping and learning opportunities whose effect is to increase the scope to influence 
public policy on the regional or local territory. For non-legislative regions and local 
authorities the CoR, even with its modest powers, opens up new possibilities for 
exchange of experience, coalition-building and, at the margin, policy-shaping. The 
majority of the CoR membership has a contradictory interest in mobilising for Europe 
to that of the legislative regions. 
4.  And fourth, there were and are for legislative regions in particular other and better 
routes to pursue their interests in European decision-making: through representative 
offices in Brussels, transnational networks like RegLeg and, above all, through the 
member state, through domestic EU policy-making processes. 
 
For legislative regions which had envisaged the CoR as a powerful ‘third level’ institution, 
the reality was in other words a profound disappointment. The result was the abandonment by 
the legislative regions of any serious attempt to build up the CoR as a structure for engaging 
an EU-wide ‘third level’ with EU decision-making. They increasingly broke away from the 
wider mass of regional and local authorities and instead ‘returned’ to the member state, 
placing an new emphasis on member state channels as the most effective way of shaping or – 
more recently – deflecting EU policies with an impact on domestic regional competences. 
 
 
3. Plan B: Accessing the EU through the Member State 
 
The ‘member state strategy’ – so to speak the Plan B of the legislative regions – had always 
been a parallel track for the Belgian and German regions, and by the time the CoR was in 
operation, formal rights had been established in both countries for the regional level to shape 
and in some cases determine the member state’s policy on EU matters falling under the 
domestic competence of the regions. Similar rights were established in Austria on its 
accession to the EU in 1995. Less formalised and generally less far-reaching practices of 
central-regional coordination in EU policy have also been established in Spain (though with a 
more formalised system of access emerging), and in the UK. The main mechanisms of 
central-regional government coordination within these member states are set out in Table 
One.  
 
Regions in Belgium, Austria, Germany, Spain and the UK all have rights of access to relevant 
information on EU matters, and in all cases a routinised system has been established for 
forwarding information on from the EU, via central government, and onward to the regions. 
And in all these cases arrangements have been established to formulate regional opinions, and 
to feed these into the EU decision-making of central government authorities. These 
arrangements vary widely. In Belgium, following a radical decentralisation process, there is 
no hierarchy of status between regions
3 and central government. The lead role in EU policy-
making varies by issue; the level of government which holds the corresponding domestic 
competence for the issue concerned takes the lead. But in order to maintain a coordinated 
Belgium-wide position across issue areas, in practice each level of government is involved in 
all issue areas. All governments, central and regional, are therefore involved as equal partners 
in a systematic, collective EU policy formulation process, and each represents Belgium in the 
EU Council whenever it holds the domestic competence for the issue area concerned 
(Kerremans and Beyers, 1996). 
                                                 
3   Belgium has two largely overlapping forms of regional government, Regions, and Communities. For 
simplicity’s sake we use ‘region’ to include both. 6 
 
Table One: Central-Regional Coordination on EU Policy 
Mechanism Belgium  Germany  Austria UK  Spain   
Full information on EU developments  √  √  √  √  √ 
Decisions have binding effect on centre in 
fields of regional competence 
√  √  √  X  ? 
Participate in meetings to instruct 
Permanent Representative 
√ X √  √  X 
Represent member state in Council of 
Ministers in fields of regional competence 
√  √  √  √  ? 
Contribute to member state decision-
making in IGCs 
√  √  √  X  X 
Run Presidency of EU Council jointly with 
the centre 
√ X X X  X 
 
In Austria and Germany, policy formulation has two stages: a first in which the regions come 
to a collective viewpoint; and a second where the collective regional position is connected 
with central government’s decision-making process. That process is constitutionally codified 
in the both cases, and allows the regions a ‘decisive’ voice where EU matters directly affect 
regional competences. In those cases (subject to caveats at the margins) a collective regional 
opinion is binding on central government, and the centre must represent that opinion in EU 
bodies. Equally the regions have the right to lead delegations in the EU Council on issues 
which touch on the ‘heartland’ of their exclusive legislative competences in the domestic 
arena. It should be noted that neither the Austrian nor the German federal system allocates a 
wide range of exclusive legislative competences to the regions; so Austrian regional 
participation in the Council is rare and German participation has been limited to four main 
areas, education, culture, media, and justice and home affairs, with a periodic presence also on 
research matters (Börzel 2002: 81). More recently the range of policy areas the German 
Länder lead on for Germany has been narrowed to school education, culture and broadcasting, 
though with a more fully established right to lead in those fields as a quid pro quo (Jeffery 
2007a: 17). In both Germany and Austria the real ‘meat’ of participation in EU matters is in 
domestic coordination processes between centre and regions, not in the Council.  
 
In Spain central governments have traditionally resisted the award of rights of participation in 
EU affairs to regions. So while a range of intergovernmental conferences exist for regional-
central exchanges of views, these lack constitutional underpinning and have as a result at best 
an advisory role. There is no obligation for the centre to represent any collectively held 
regional view nor to allow a regional presence in the EU Council. In any case the Spanish 
regions have been slow to develop a practice of collective opinion-formation on EU (and, 
indeed, other) matters, not least because asymmetrical regionalisation has encouraged inter-
regional competition and bilateral deal-making with the centre (Börzel 2002: 98-100). A new 
deal struck early in 2005 appears to have established new formal procedures for the collective 
representation of regional views in core areas of competence, and to allow the regions access 
to the EU Council. It remains unclear as to whether the traditional patterns of central-regional 
suspicions and inter-regional competition will be overcome sufficiently to give the new 
procedures the clout their equivalents have in Austria and Germany. 
 7 
In the UK the devolution reforms in the late 1990s established a practice of information-
sharing and inclusion of devolved government representatives from Scotland in particular 
which has been on paper quite extensive. These practices are not, however, embedded in law 
and depend on goodwill between central and devolved government. There is some evidence 
that even in the atmosphere of broad goodwill that has existed since the launch of devolution 
in 1999 the levels of openness and sensitivity across central government departments to 
devolved interests has been variable, with some ignoring and others actively frustrating those 
interests (Aron 2007). That variable pattern unfolded in a period of cooperation between a 
Labour UK government and a Labour-dominated coalition in Scotland. The transition in 2007 
to a minority government in Scotland led by a separatist Scottish National Party is likely to 
usher in a period in which the UK government is rather less inclusive of at least Scottish 
interests in EU policy. 
 
Clearly the impact of these practices of intergovernmental coordination varies. In Belgium 
each region effectively has a veto over all aspects of Belgian EU policy. In Spain, where 
central government until recently tried to resist regional input to central state decision-
making, and where the regions have failed to build a common front to get maximum 
concessions from the centre, regional influence is much more limited. The reliance in the UK 
on ‘goodwill’ rather than law as a basis for the inclusion of devolved governments in member 
state decision-making may well mean that a Scottish government which is uncongenial to the 
UK government is marginalised. In a less abrupt way, party politics has played a role in 
Germany, where for almost all of the period since German unification in 1990, the federal 
government coalition has been faced by a set of governments in the Länder dominated by the 
federal opposition. 
 
Party politics, in other words, may complicate the process of aggregating and reconciling the 
interests of the relevant players. That process is in any case inherently difficult. With the 
exception of the UK, all the other cases in Table One now have regional rights in co-
determining member state EU policy which have to be used collectively. There has to be one 
regional view. That means finding a common position among six Belgian regions, nine 
Austrian, sixteen German, seventeen Spanish. Inevitably that view takes a fairly low common 
denominator, watering down competing regional priorities, and generally imposing, however 
impressive the right to a ‘decisive’ view or even a veto power might sound, fairly modest 
conditions on member state central governments (Jeffery 2007a: 22). The logic of 
compromise inherent in intergovernmental coordination in EU policy underlies the shift from 
a Plan B of participation through the member state to a more defensive Plan C focused on 
regional autonomy. A process of trading off interests with other regions and with central 
governments on a statewide scale has, as the following excursus suggests, become inimical to 
the way at least some regions have come to understand their relationships with both the states 
of which they form part and the EU.  
 
 
Excursus: A Regionalisation of Citizenship? 
 
T.H. Marshall’s classic work (1992 [1950]) on Citizenship and Social Class is a useful 
framework for capturing that understanding. Marshall made a landmark contribution to the 
understanding of the citizenship rights members of the UK enjoyed at the mid-point of the 
20
th Century, in particular their extension to include social rights in the postwar welfare state. 
Marshall’s work, in particular its connection to understandings of the welfare state, remains 8 
influential in the UK (King 1987, Pateman 1988, Lister 2005) but also in Germany
4 (Rieger 
1992, cf. Flora/Alber 1981), and beyond (e.g. Banting 2006).  
 
Marshall distinguished three components of citizenship in the UK: civil rights, political rights, 
and social rights. In their modern form these emerged in sequence, each the precondition of 
the next (Table Two). Civil rights, protecting individual freedoms, emerged in something like 
the modern form in the 18
th century in part as a set of defences of individual liberty versus the 
state, in part as a set of abolitions of restrictive practices which opened up the space for a 
market economy. Modern political rights – the right to participate in the exercise of political 
power through voting or standing as a candidate – emerged during the 19
th century as new 
social interests exploited freedoms of speech and association to open up a political system 
dominated up to then by privileged groups of aristocrats, landowners and industrialists.  
 
Table Two: The Evolution of UK Citizenship Rights 
UK 18
th Century  19
th Century  20
th Century 
Civil Rights  √  √  √ 
Political 
Rights 
  √  √ 
Social Rights     √ 
 
Social rights followed the final expansions of the franchise in the early 20
th century which, by 
1945, had enabled a majority Labour government buoyed by the votes of the working class to 
come to power. Social rights were embedded in the postwar, national welfare state. They 
consisted of minimum standards of welfare, guaranteed by the state, so that the working class 
in particular was protected from risks of ill-health, old age, unemployment and so on, paid for 
as an expression of statewide social solidarity through taxation.  
 
Marshall’s is a compelling analysis, echoed in similar analyses of the evolution, and 
accumulation of functions, of the modern state (Leibfried and Zürn 2005). There are, though, 
two qualifications which need to be entered, both concerning the assumption in Marshall that 
citizenship rights are a uniform feature of what he called nation-statehood.   
 
The first has to do with Marshall’s own elusiveness on territory. Marshall (1992 [1950]: 9) 
claimed that the citizenship whose history he wanted to trace was ‘by definition, national’. 
That ‘nation’ might appear at first glance to be the UK as a whole. But as Daniel Wincott 
(2006: 181) has stressed, Marshall in fact ‘equates the nation with England’. He simply 
ignores Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. That equation matters because successor 
analysis has read into Marshall the notion that social rights should have a statewide reach, that 
rights to welfare should be driven by need, not by where one lives, and that they therefore act 
as a force of statewide integration, an expression of a statewide political community 
extending beyond England to encompass the whole of the UK. 
 
There is a line here between advocacy and social science which has often been blurred, and 
which has obscured the point that in the UK (and elsewhere), the services guaranteed by the 
welfare state have never been territorially uniform. They have not been uniform in part 
because governments have never been capable of delivering uniformity (or even committed to 
uniformity, even within England – Bulpitt 1983: 141); and they have not been uniform 
because in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales there have long been different arrangements, 
                                                 
4   Marshall had been Commissioner for Education in the postwar British Occupation Zone in Germany. 9 
laws, spending levels and so on which mean that the reality of, say, Scottish welfare is rather 
different than that in England.  
 
Nonetheless Marshall’s (mythical) imagery of a territory-blind, national welfare state has 
persisted, reified by a ‘methodological nationalism’ (Leibfried and Zürn 2005) which assumes 
that societies organised as ‘nation-states’ are ‘the natural social and political form of the 
modern world’ (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002: 302). One aspect of that reification is a 
tendency to freeze-frame Marshall to support a particular understanding of the national 
welfare state that emerged after World War II. Yet Marshall viewed citizenship as dynamic, 
ever-changing, as its various components interacted to produce shifting outcomes. It is worth 
quoting him on this point, from the celebrated lectures on citizenship he gave in 1949, shortly 
after the UK National Health Service had been established, when he described his three sets 
of citizenship rights as a kind of championship steeplechase extending over centuries: 
 
Before long they were spread far out along the course, and it is only in the present 
century, in fact I might say only within the last few months, that the three runners have 
come abreast of one another (Marshall 1992 [1950]: 9). 
 
Logic suggests that if the three sets of citizenship rights only came abreast of one another in 
1949, there is no reason that they should have stayed there in a synchronised canter ever 
since. Table Three sets out the territorial scales at which Marshall’s three sets of rights are 
realised in the early 21
st century. While the statewide scale is clearly still a location for the 
rights of citizens, it is not the only one. It was perhaps a near-exclusive location for those 
rights for a short period in the middle of the 20
th century, but more or less at the point when 
Marshall had lined up his three sets of rights as definitions of a national political community, 
they began to diffuse to other territorial scales, both European and regional. 
 
Table Three: Territorial Scales of Citizenship Rights in the 21
st Century 
21st century  Region  State  European 
Union 
Civil Rights    √  √ 
Political 
Rights 
√  √ ( √) 
Social Rights  √  √  √ 
 
For example, Marshall’s civil rights included freedoms to trade without restrictive practice. 
The main framework for realising such freedoms has long been a European one, beginning 
with the first steps in European economic integration in the 1950s, and now significantly 
more important in regulating economic activity than national law. And should the European 
Constitution ever come into force, European citizens will have a constitutional charter of 
fundamental rights as a guarantee of their civil rights additional to national-level guarantees. 
The EU is also an arena for exercising rights of political participation, though these remain of 
a ‘second order’ (Reif and Schmitt 1980; Schmitt 2004) quality behind state-level rights. And 
social rights are beginning to take on a European dimension alongside their state-level ones, 
often – as Marshall might have suggested – as a consequence of EU-level civil rights such as 
freedom of movement, which have begun to make access to social rights portable across state 
borders within the EU (Greer 2006).  
 
As striking as these developments in the Europeanisation of citizenship has been a parallel 
regionalisation of citizenship. This has to do in particular with the devolution of powers of 10 
government in Europe over the last thirty years or so – with Spain, Belgium, Italy, France and 
the UK emerging as regionalised states alongside the established federal states of Germany, 
Switzerland and Austria.  
 
As a result political rights are now exercised at both statewide and regional scales in these 
places, and are expressed through different patterns of voting behaviour, party competition 
and government composition at those different scales of political community. And one effect 
– again consistent with Marshall’s understanding of the way different sets of citizenship rights 
interact – is that social rights are now being understood and delivered by regional 
governments in ways which increasingly depart from the traditional imagery of the national 
welfare state, with its emphasis on uniform public services across the whole state territory 
(McEwen and Moreno 2005; McEwen 2006; Jeffery 2006; Wincott 2006). 
 
This process of regionalisation of citizenship appears most pronounced when one, or both, of 
two factors is present (Jeffery 2006; 2007b). The first concerns inter-regional economic 
disparity. Elite and/or public opinion in parts of Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK 
show evidence of a growing unwillingness on the part of economically stronger regions to 
share wealth and equalise welfare risk on a statewide scale where there are wide disparities 
between richer and poorer regions. The second concerns sub-state territorial identity. Elite 
and/or public opinion in parts of Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK which have 
strong sub-state identities show evidence of a growing desire for fuller ‘ownership’ of 
decision-making (that is, more powers) at regional levels of government. In some places – in 
Bavaria, Flanders, Catalonia, parts of northern Italy – regional wealth and territorial identity 
coincide as powerful, dual challenges to all the accumulated imagery of the ‘nation-state’ as 
the ‘natural social and political form of the modern world’.  
 
 
4. Plan C: The Regional Rescue of the Nation-State 
 
In these ways some regions pose challenges to the established functions of European states. 
Places like Bavaria, Catalonia, Flanders, Lombardy and Scotland find the scale or obligations 
of statewide political community in some ways to be incompatible with their understandings 
of regional political community, and have sought in response to maximise their decision-
making autonomy within the state. In the German case I described this as a new ‘Sinatra-
doctrine’ of (some of) the Länder, involving a renunciation of older norms of equality and 
solidarity and focused instead on ‘doing it my way’ (Jeffery 1998). The same analogy could 
be applied in broad brush in Belgium, Italy, Spain and the UK. 
 
But, as Table Three indicates, regions focused on autonomy-maximisation are not engaged in 
a simple two-level game. Functions that were once concentrated at a statewide scale, and the 
decision-making powers that go with them, are now dispersed both inward to regions and 
outward to the EU. There is a three-level game at play. In that three-level game – for reasons 
set out in part 1. of this paper – regional governments have traditionally been marginalised, 
and central governments empowered, when the EU has taken responsibility for functions 
(once) held by regions under domestic law. For that reason places like Bavaria, Catalonia, 
Flanders, Lombardy and Scotland have also come to find the scale and obligations of political 
community in the EU to be as problematic as, perhaps more problematic than, those at the 
level of the state. That is why regions like these have been at the forefront of efforts to 
compensate for the distorting effect European integration has on the balance between regional 
and central governments within member states.  11 
 
The first of those efforts – Plan A, embodied in the CoR – foundered on the unclear purpose, 
weakness of powers and diversity of membership of the CoR. Plan B has been at best a 
qualified success because of need to establish collective positions horizontally among 
regional governments and then vertically between regional and central governments. For 
reasons of economic disparity and sub-state identity some regions are less and less of a 
mindset to trade individual interests, and the autonomy to pursue them, for a collective 
common denominator. Sinatra-doctrines do not just apply to domestic politics, but are also 
exported into the EU. But Plan B is about ‘our way’, not ‘my way’. 
 
Enter Plan C, which is associated with regions in the RegLeg grouping, and has over the last 
decade or so, and in particular in the debate on the European Constitution, focused on 
establishing more robust constitutional safeguards around regional-level competences in the 
context of European integration.  
 
What the legislative regions brought to the constitutional debate were vigorous arguments for 
defining the limits of EU-level powers more clearly. They did so with more vigour, and more 
effect, than even traditionally Eurosceptic member state central governments. In fact the 
definition, and limitation, of EU powers in the Constitution is pretty much that put on the 
agenda in an influential speech by a German regional prime minister in 2001 (Clement, 2001 - 
which itself drew on a paper prepared by the German Länder in the context of the 1996-7 IGC 
which culminated in Amsterdam; cf. Jeffery 2004: 9).  
 
Some legislative regions went further by arguing for re-nationalisation, that is returning 
powers currently exercised at the EU level to the member states. And legislative regions were 
at the heart of debates about policing the reach of EU powers through tougher provisions on 
subsidiarity, the principle that the EU should only act when effective action by lower-level 
governments is not possible. One of the outcomes was a new ‘early warning system’ to allow 
national parliaments to protest about EU legislation on subsidiarity grounds. 
 
The common denominator in all of this is how regions have adopted the member state as their 
favoured interface with the EU. There was much less emphasis than in the past on reforming 
EU-level institutions to open up space for a more participative regional contribution. There 
was much more emphasis instead on hardening the boundaries of the member state as a means 
also of ring-fencing regional autonomy within the member state: if the limits of EU powers 
vis-à-vis the member state were defined more tightly, then so would be their limits vis-à-vis 
regions within member states; if competences were to be renationalised, then under domestic 
law, the effect in many cases would be re-regionalisation; if national parliaments won greater 
rights to police the subsidiarity principle, then regional institutions could argue for a share in 
those rights through appropriate procedures within the member state (and this indeed is what 
they have done in the UK, Belgium, Germany and Austria – Ziller and Jeffery 2007).  
 
It is in that sense that legislative regions have ‘rescued the nation-state’. Given the way the 
three-level game of European integration is loaded against legislative regions, and in order to 
maximise their decision-making autonomy, they have increasingly found it opportune to tuck 
themselves in behind the battered carapace of the member state as the best way of securing 
their distinctive interest of preserving the meaning of their law-making powers. Perhaps this 
might be termed, post-Sinatra, the Garbo-doctrine of the legislative regions: now they just 
want to be left alone.  
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